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Abstract
The argument for protecting artifacts in Iraq takes on added strength when the United States
recognizes that the country is where it is today not just because of its failure to provide sufficient
security to overcome the long-festering tribal and religious animosities, but also because of its
continuing failure to appreciate the importance Iraqis place on the preservation of their history.
This failure to protect a rich heritage going back to the dawn of civilization has convinced many in
Iraq and the Middle East that the U.S. does not care about any culture other than its own. And their
belief is continually reinforced: four years after the initial looting - and despite having recovered
almost 6,000 antiquities since then - the U.S. cannot keep pace with the artifacts that are being
looted every day.
THIEVES OF BAGHDAD: COMBATING
GLOBAL TRAFFIC IN STOLEN
IRAQI ANTIQUITIES
Colonel Matthew Bogdanos *
INTRODUCTION
As the head of the investigation into one of the greatest art
crimes in recent memory-the looting of the Iraq Museum in
2003-I have spent more than four years attempting to recover
and return to the Iraqi people their priceless heritage.' I have
spent almost as much time, however, attempting to correct the
almost universal misconceptions about what happened at the
museum in those fateful days in April 2003, to increase aware-
ness of the continuing cultural catastrophe that is represented
by the illegal trade in stolen antiquities, and to highlight the
need for the concerted and cooperative efforts of the interna-
tional community to preserve, protect, and recover the shared
cultural heritage of all humanity.
Indeed, in more than one hundred and seventy-five
speeches in more than one hundred cities in twelve countries-
in venues ranging from universities, museums, and governmen-
tal organizations to law-enforcement agencies, Interpol (the In-
ternational Criminal Police Organization) and both houses of
the British Parliament-I have urged a more active role for gov-
ernments, international organizations, cultural organizations
and foundations, and the art community.
I have not been very successful. Most governments have
their hands full combating terrorism, with few resources left to
* Colonel Matthew Bogdanos has been an assistant district attorney in Manhattan,
New York, since 1988. A colonel in the Marine Corps Reserves, middleweight boxer,
author, and native New Yorker, he holds advanced degrees in law, classics, and military
strategy. Recalled to active duty after September 11, 2001, he received a Bronze Star for
counterterrorist operations in Afghanistan, served two tours in Iraq, and received a
2005 National Humanities Medal for his work recovering Iraq's treasures. He has re-
turned to the DA's Office and continues the hunt for stolen antiquities. Parts of the
following essay are adapted from THIEVES OF BAGHDAD: ONE MARINE'S PASSION TO RE-
COVER THE WORLD'S GREATEST STOLEN TREAsu-as (2005). Reprinted by permission of
Bloomsbury USA. Copyright 2005 by Matthew Bogdanos. All royalties from the sale of
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1. See Matthew Bogdanos, The Casualties of War: The Truth about the Iraq Museum,
109 AM. J. ARCHAEOLOGY 477, 477-79 (2005).
726 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol.31:725
spare for tracking down stolen artifacts. Most international orga-
nizations are content to issue proclamations, preferring to hit
the conference center rather than the streets. Many cultural or-
ganizations and foundations are equally content to issue a call
for papers rather than a call to action. As for the art community,
some members wash their hands of unpleasant realities and ar-
gue that, while technically illegal, the market in purloined antiq-
uities is benign-victimless-as long as it brings the art to those
who can properly protect it and appreciate it (namely, them-
selves).
And as the investigation continues, much has happened to
reinforce the core lesson we learned in the back alleys of Bagh-
dad: that the genteel patina covering the world of antiquities
rests atop a solid base of criminal activity. Witness the events
taking place in the United States since 2003. In New York, the
Metropolitan Museum (the "Met") accepted what amounted to a
plea bargain with Italian authorities-agreeing to return twenty-
one separate antiquities the Italian government says were stolen,
including one of the Met's most prized items: the Euphronios
krater, a sixth century B.C. Greek vase.2 In Missouri, the St.
Louis Art Museum broke off negotiations with Egypt over the
museum's possession of a thirteenth century B.C. pharaonic
mask that Egyptian authorities claim was stolen and smuggled
illegally out of their country.3 In California, the director of theJ.
Paul Getty Museum agreed to recommend to its trustees that the
Getty return antiquities the Greek government says were sto-
len-while the Getty's longtime curator for ancient art resigned
and is currently on trial in Rome on charges of conspiracy to
receive a completely different set of stolen artifacts.4 More trials
are sure to follow.
I am delighted that nations are moving to reclaim their pat-
rimony. I am also delighted to see media attention beginning to
illuminate certain well-appointed shadows where money changes
hands and legitimate-but inconvenient-questions of the prov-
enance (origin) of the object are too frequently considered ou-
tr6.
2. See Randy Kennedy & Hugh Eakin, The Met, Ending 30-Year Stance, Is Set to Yield
Prized Vase to Italy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2006, at Al.
3. See Malcolm Gay, Out of Egypt, RivERFRoNr TIMES (St. Louis, Mo.), Feb. 15, 2006.
4. See Christopher Reynolds, The Puzzle of Marion True, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2005, at
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But shadows remain. In March 2006, for example, private
collector Shelby White donated $200 million to New York Uni-
versity to establish an ancient studies institute, prompting one of
the university's professors to resign in protest over what he con-
sidered the questionable acquisition practices of the donor.5 Ms.
White and her late husband Leon Levy have generated consider-
able debate since at least 1990, when the Met (of which Ms.
White is a Trustee) presented a major exhibition of 200 of their
artifacts from Greece, Rome, and the Near East.6 The Met did
so despite the fact that a study later published in the American
Journal of Archaeology determined that more than ninety percent
of those artifacts had no known provenance whatsoever.' As
with the Euphronios krater, Italian authorities have consistently
maintained that they can prove many of the antiquities in the
Levy-White collection were illegally excavated (a.k.a., stolen) and
smuggled out of their country.8
Not only did the Met proudly display that collection, dubi-
ous provenance notwithstanding, but it also (coincidentally?)
celebrated the opening of its new Leon Levy and Shelby White
Court for Hellenistic and Roman antiquities on April 15, 2007.'
Other institutions continue to hold out one hand while covering
their eyes with the other. In 2000, Cornell University accepted a
gift from well-known collector Jonathan Rosen of 1,679 cunei-
form tablets from Ur."° They said, "Thank you very much," de-
spite reports of widespread looting at Ur after the 1991 Persian
Gulf War, and despite the fact that the provenance of ten per-
cent of the tablets consisted of the phrase "uncertain sites."1
Harvard University has done equally well in neglecting to ask
awkward questions-witness its Shelby White-Leon Levy Pro-
gram for Archaeological Publications.12
5. See Elisabetta Povoledo, Top Collector is Asked to Relinquish Artifacts, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2006, at El.
6. See id.
7. See Kate Taylor, Shelby White in Center Court at the Met, N.Y. SUN, May 1, 2007, at 3.
See generally Christopher Chippindale & David W.J. Gill, Material Consequences of Contem-
porary Classical Collecting, 104 AM. J. ARCHAEOLOGY 463 (2000).
8. See Povoledo, supra note 5.
9. See Taylor, supra note 7, at 3.
10. See Martin Gottlieb & Barry Meier, Ancient Art at the Met Raises Old Ethical Ques-
tions, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 2, 2003, at Al.
11. See id.
12. See Robin Pogrebin, US$200 Million Gift Prompts a Debate Over Antiquities, N.Y.
TiMES, Apr. 1, 2006, at Al.
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But this is nothing new. In 1994, a decade before its current
imbroglio, the Getty displayed a major exhibition of classical an-
tiquities owned by Lawrence and Barbara Fleischman.' 3 Like the
Met, the Getty proudly held this exhibit despite the fact that
ninety-two percent of the objects in the Fleischman collection
had no provenance whatsoever, and the remaining eight percent
had questionable provenance at best. 4 To put it in starker
terms, of 295 catalogued entries, not a single object had a de-
clared archeological find spot and only three (one percent)
were even described as coming from a specific location.
Sometimes, however, the questionable practices extend be-
yond merely willful ignorance. Consider the following. Prior to
the exhibition in 1994, the Fleischman collection had never
been published. Thus, the first catalogue for, and hence first
publication of, the Fleischman exhibit was the Getty's-of which
Ms. Fleischman was a trustee. Fewer than two years later, the
Getty purchased part of that collection for US$20 million.1 5 But
the Getty had a stated policy of not purchasing objects unless
they have been previously displayed in published collections.
How, then, could they possibly have justified the acquisition?
Easy: the Getty was quick to point out that the collection had
been published just two years earlier-by themselves.
Further sweetening the deal, while the collection had been
purchased originally at a much lower price, it was valued at
US$80 million at the time of the sale to the museum.1 6 Tax laws
use the fair market value at the time of the sale rather than the
original purchase price in determining the value of a bequest.
As a result, the difference between the 1996 valuation of US$80
million and the US$20 million sale price to the Getty would be
deemed a gift of US$60 million-affording a US$60 million tax
deduction for the Fleischmans. Under these terms, the gift to
the Getty, therefore, was actually financed by United States tax-
payers. Enron's accounting team could not have done a better
job.
In many respects, then, we have advanced very little since
the imperial nineteenth century, when Lord Elgin could haul
13. SeeJason Felch & Ralph Frammoloino, The Return of Antiquities A Blow to Getty,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2007, at Al.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
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away the Parthenon Marbles (now in the British Museum and
commonly referred to as the "Elgin Marbles") and Henry Layard
could haul away the Nineveh reliefs (now in the Met). Despite
the hue and cry of the last several years, the Met's current policy
is to require documentation covering only the last ten years of
an object's history.1 7 This, even though most institutions view
1970-the year of the landmark United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO") Convention' 8
to regulate the transfer of antiquities-as the cut-off date for re-
quiring proof that an antiquity was not illegally looted.'9
The imposition of a firm date (here, 1970) is crucial in stop-
ping the trade in illegal antiquities. As each year passes, it be-
comes less and less likely that a previously unpublished (and
hence unknown) antiquity can appear on the market and be le-
gal-either in the sense of having come from a properly sanc-
tioned excavation or from some ancient collection that was as-
sembled before the imposition of any requirement of documen-
tation. To put it another way, as each year passes, it becomes
increasingly certain that previously unpublished items are stolen.
Thus, the Met's policy of requiring documentation covering
only the last ten years of an object's history becomes more un-
supportable as each year passes. For example, in May of 2013,
the Met could begin to buy items stolen from the Iraq Museum
in April 2003 without violating its stated policy. All it need do is
not ask where it comes from before the ten-year window. As if to
flaunt the Met's policy of "see no evil," Philippe de Montebello,
the museum's director, told the New York Times in February 2006
that the context in which an artifact is found is virtually mean-
ingless; in his opinion, it accounts for less than two percent of
what we can learn from antiquity.20 His position is as absurd as
the equally unreasonable view of some purists that context is eve-
rything.21
But far from this world of museum receptions and limos
17. See generally The Metropolitan Museum of Art, http://www.metmuseum.org
(last visited Feb. 25, 2008).
18. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Ex-
port and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231.
19. See Pogrebin, supra note 12.
20. Randy Kennedy & Hugh Eakin, Met Chief Unbowed, Defends Museum's Role, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006, at El.
21. See id.
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waiting at the curb, however, there has been an even more
troubling development. In June 2005, U.S. Marines in northwest
Iraq arrested five insurgents holed up in underground bunkers
filled with automatic weapons, ammunition stockpiles, black
uniforms, ski masks, and night-vision goggles. Along with these
tools of their trade, were thirty vases, cylinder seals, and statu-
ettes that had been stolen from the Iraq Museum. Since then,
the scenario has been repeated many times. It does not take a
counterterrorism expert to detect the sinister adjustment that
has taken place. In 2003, when pursuing leads to recover antiq-
uities, we usually came across weapons and links to violent
groups. Now, as security forces pursue leads for weapons and
insurgents, they find antiquities. In a modern-day version of the
old "molasses to rum to slaves" triangle trade of pious New En-
gland ship captains and owners who sang hymns and offered
prayers while getting rich off human misery, the cozy cabal of
academics, dealers, and collectors who turn a blind eye to the
illicit side of the trade is, in effect, supporting the insurgents
who are killing our troops in Iraq.
This is not surprising. As the National Commission on Ter-
rorist Attacks Upon the United States ("the 9-11 Commission")
noted, international law enforcement has aggressively attacked
traditional means of terrorist financing by freezing assets and
neutralizing charities that had previously served as fronts for
jihadists.22 But terrorists are nothing if not adaptive. In late
2005, the German newspaper Der Spiegel reported that 9-11 con-
spirator Mohammed Atta had approached a professor at the
University of Goettingen trying to sell Afghan antiquities to raise
money to buy an airplane.23 While nothing came of that inquiry,
times have changed. Like the Taliban in Afghanistan who have
learned to finance their activities through opium, insurgents in
Iraq have discovered a new source of income in Iraq's cash crop:
antiquities.
We do not have hard numbers-the traffic in art for arms is
still too recent a phenomenon, and some of the investigations
remain classified because of the connection to terrorists. But
this illicit trade has become a growing source of revenue for the
22. See Col. Matthew Bogdanos, Op-Ed., The Terrorist in the Art Gallery, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 2005, at A15.
23. See Art for Financing Terrorism?, DER SPIEGEL (F.R.G.), July 18, 2005, at 20.
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insurgents; ranking just below kidnappings for ransom and "pro-
tection" money from local residents and merchants. Iraq is a war
zone, but it is also the cradle of civilization, with 10,000 poorly
guarded archaeological sites. 24 Among the most prized items
from those sites are cylinder seals, intricately carved pieces of
stone about the size of a piece of chalk, that can sell for
US$250,000, enabling an insurgent to smuggle millions of dol-
lars in his pocket. Given this almost limitless supply of antiqui-
ties, the insurgency appears to have found an income stream suf-
ficiently secure to make any chief financial officer sleep well at
night. As a result, the desert night is filled with the roar of bull-
dozers ripping into the ancient mounds of clay that were once
thriving cities.
All the while, the situation in Iraq has deteriorated dramati-
cally, seemingly descending into chaos-with a majority of the
U.S. electorate increasingly reluctant to risk American blood to
save Iraqi lives. So it's a pretty tough sell to ask people to care
about a bunch of old rocks with funny writing. Finding the polit-
ical will to divert resources to saving cultural artifacts, no matter
how precious, seems like cutting funding for police and fire in
order to expand the public library. There might be a case for it,
but when? After all, looting has always been a cottage industry in
Iraq, the region that gave birth not just to agriculture, cities, the
wheel, and pottery, but to war and conquest as well.
The argument for protecting artifacts takes on added
strength when we recognize that we are where we are today, not
just because of our failure to provide sufficient security to over-
come the long-festering tribal and religious animosities, but also
because of our continuing failure to appreciate the importance
Iraqis place on the preservation of their history. This failure to
protect a rich heritage going back to the dawn of civilization has
convinced many in Iraq and the Middle East that we do not care
about any culture other than our own. And their belief is con-
tinually reinforced: four years after the initial looting-and de-
spite having recovered almost 6,000 antiquities since then-we
cannot keep pace with the artifacts that are being looted every
day.
24. See Bogdanos, supra note 22, at A15.
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I. PROTECT ARCHAEOLOGICAL SITES
Based on my experience in both counterterrorism and law
enforcement-and as a result of the time I have spent in Iraq
and throughout the world in tracking down the stolen antiqui-
ties-I submit that the first order of business in addressing this
catastrophe must be to protect the archaeological sites. Some of
these, such as Babylon and Nimrud, require several hundred
guards and support staff for protection around the clock. The
math is daunting: country-wide more than 50,000 personnel are
required, along with the necessary vehicles, radios, weapons, and
logistical needs. But there is an immediate solution.
In other contexts, the United Nations ("U.N.") and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ("NATO") have acted to ad-
dress catastrophic situations. In Bosnia, Cyprus, and Afghani-
stan, for example, many countries have provided contingents for
specific missions under U.N. or NATO auspices. But not in Iraq.
The reasons are much-argued, and I will not revisit them here.
Recalling Voltaire's observation that "everyone is guilty of the
good he didn't do," I will focus instead on what we can do now.
So who might act? In the past, most archaeological digs in
Iraq have had foreign sponsorship-the Germans at Babylon
and Uruk, the British at Ur and Nimrud, the French at Kish and
Lagash, the Italians at Hatra and Nimrud, the Americans at Nip-
pur and Ur.25 Leveraging this history, I propose that these (and
eventually other) countries provide forces to protect Iraq's
archaeological sites until a professional Iraqi security force dedi-
cated to the sites can be recruited, equipped, and trained.
Under this proposal, and with the permission of the Iraqi
government, facilitated by the U.S. military, and under the au-
thority of the U.N. or NATO, each country would "adopt" a site.
After sending an assessment team to the assigned sites to deter-
mine the precise numbers and type of personnel and equipment
required, each donor nation would then draft and sign bilateral
status of forces agreements with Iraq, outlining the rules of en-
gagement, funding, billeting, and the standard logistical issues.
Then, each country would deploy its security forces (military, po-
lice, private contractors, or a combination of all three) to the
25. See Col. Matthew Bogdanos, Op-Ed., Fighting for Iraq's Culture, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
6, 2007, at A21.
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agreed-upon archaeological sites around the perimeter and
around the clock.
Upon arrival, each country's contingent would also be as-
signed a group of Iraqi recruits (who would live and work with
them) to train at their chosen site. Once those Iraqi security
forces were fully trained-that ordinarily takes six months-the
donor nation would recall (or reassign) its forces on a site-by-site
basis. In half a year, every archaeological site of consequence in
Iraq could be completely protected from the looters. Mesopota-
mia's cultural patrimony would be safe, Al-Jezeera would have to
find other ways to show Western indifference to Arab culture,
and the terrorists would have to find another income source.
Unfortunately, neither NATO nor the U.N. has such plans
in the works. NATO opened a training center in Iraq in 2005,
but has trained only 1,500 Iraqi security personnel, none of
whom have been assigned to archaeological sites. The U.N. has
never trained guards for the sites. Even the U.N.'s cultural arm,
UNESCO has failed to act, claiming it has no such mandate from
its member nations.
Assuming that to be true, UNESCO ought to convince its
member nations to support such an initiative. It is time for the
U.N. to seize the mantle of international leadership and con-
vince its members to support such a plan. As our best hope,
UNESCO ought to step into the vacuum of international leader-
ship, seize the bully pulpit, and become relevant again. "Man
should share the action and passion of his time," former Su-
preme Court justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once noted, "at
peril of being judged never to have lived."
Individual countries are also slow to respond. Only the
Italians, Danes, Dutch, and Poles have joined the Americans and
British in protecting these sites-and the Danes, Dutch, and
Italians have already left. Other countries have argued that the
level of violence does not permit deployment of their forces.
The circular nature of this rationalization is underscored by the
fact that it is the failure to protect these sites that is partly fund-
ing those who are creating the unsafe environment. "If you were
to take account of everything that could go wrong," Herodotus
advised long ago, "you would never act." Of course there is risk.
I know this first-hand. But the risks of the failure to act are far
worse: more money for the insurgents, more propaganda for Al-
2008]
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Jezeera, and the loss of these extraordinary testaments to our
common beginnings.
Equally risky are the politics: most elected officials view in-
volvement in Iraq as political suicide. But an internationally co-
ordinated contribution of personnel would not be a statement
about the war or the Bush administration's policies in Iraq. It
would be a humanitarian effort to protect a cultural heritage
rich with a common ancestry that transcends the current vio-
lence. Real leaders should have no difficulty convincing their
electorate of the distinction between politics and culture. It is,
of course, the very definition of leadership to educate, inform,
and motivate into action those who might otherwise be inclined
to do nothing.
II. THE NEXT STEPS: A FIVE-POINT ACTION PLAN
The incomparable works of art unearthed in the land be-
tween the rivers predate the split between Sunni and Shiite.
They predate the three competing traditions that have brought
so much bloodshed to the Middle East-Islam, Christianity, and
Judaism. Attending to this cultural heritage from the very dawn
of civilization reminds us of our common humanity, our com-
mon aspiration to make sense of life on this planet. I have seen
these pieces of alabaster and limestone with funny writing on
them work their magic through a language that is both immedi-
ate and universal, visceral and transcendent.
While protecting the archaeological sites in Iraq is a vital
beginning, much more needs to be done. To stop the rampant
looting and the black market that funnels money into terrorist
hands, we must adopt a comprehensive global strategy using all
of the elements of international power. Toward this end, I pro-
pose a five-step plan of action to combat the global traffic in an-
tiquities.
1. Mount a Public Relations Campaign for Mainstream Society
The cornerstone to any comprehensive approach must take
into account that real, measurable, and lasting progress in stop-
ping the illegal trade depends on increasing public awareness of
the importance of cultural property and of the magnitude of the
current crisis. First, then, we must develop and communicate a
message that resonates with mainstream society-not just with
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academics. We must create a climate of universal condemna-
tion, rather than sophisticated indulgence, for trafficking in un-
documented antiquities.
But this call to arms needs to avoid the sky-is-falling quotes
so beloved by the media, while steering clear of the debilitating
rhetoric of red state vs. blue state politics. It also has to keep the
discussion of the illegal trade separate from broader issues such
as repatriation of objects acquired prior to 1970 and whether
there should be any trade in antiquities at all. The Parthenon
Marbles are in the British Museum, but their return is a diplo-
matic or public relations issue, not a matter for the criminal
courts. Similarly, there is a legal trade in antiquities that is com-
pletely fair, regulated, and above board. And it is simply un-
proven (and unfair) to argue that the legal trade somehow en-
courages an illegal trade. Most dealers and museums scrupu-
lously do avoid trading in antiquities with a murky origin.
Repatriation for pre-1970 transfers and the question of whether
all trade in antiquities should be banned are legitimate issues,
but they are not my issues. Every time the discussion about stop-
ping the illegal trade in antiquities veers off into these broader
realms we lose focus, we lose the attention of mainstream soci-
ety, and it makes the job of recovering stolen antiquities that
much harder.
2. Provide Funding to Establish or Upgrade
Antiquities Task Forces
Second, although several countries-including the United
States, Britain, Italy, and Japan-have pledged millions of dol-
lars to upgrade the Iraq Museum, to improve its conservation
capacity, and enhance the training of the Iraq State Board of
Antiquities and Heritage's archaeological staff, not a single gov-
ernment, international organization, or private foundation any-
where in the world has provided additional funding for investi-
gative purposes. Reluctant to be seen cooperating with police
and military forces, many cultural leaders and organizations
seem oblivious to the fact that a stolen artifact cannot be re-
stored until it has been recovered. To put it more clearly:
money for conservators is pointless without first providing the
money to track down the missing objects to be conserved.
This ivory-tower distortion of priorities affects investigative
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efforts worldwide. Interpol can afford to assign only two officers
to its Iraqi Antiquities Tracking Task Force-and both have
other responsibilities as well.2 6 Scotland Yard's art and antiqui-
ties squad has four officers covering the entire world-and in
January of 2007, their budget was slashed in half.27 The United
States Federal Bureau of Investigation's ("FBI") Rapid Deploy-
ment National Art Crime Team has eight people. 28 Regardless
of the exceptional dedication and talent of these personnel, no
law-enforcement agency can operate effectively at such levels.
Thus, as a second component, all countries-but most espe-
cially the countries of origin, transit, and destination-must es-
tablish robust, specialized art and antiquities task forces, with
particular attention paid to the borders and the ports of entry.
Where such forces already exist, we must increase their size and
scope, with cultural foundations providing art-theft squads with
vehicles, computers, communications equipment, and training.
3. Create a Coordinated International
Law-Enforcement Response
Among the many dirty secrets of the looted antiquities mar-
ket is that "open" borders are as profitable as they are danger-
ous. Many countries, especially those with free ports or free-
trade zones, generate sizeable customs and excise fees from ship-
ping and-despite their public protestations to the contrary-
are not eager to impose any increase in inspection rates that
might reduce such revenue. Even if willing, the sheer tonnage
passing through certain international ports and free-trade zones
makes 100 percent inspection rates impossible. Nor does the im-
proved technology installed as a result of September 11 solve the
problem: devices that detect weapons and explosives do not de-
tect alabaster, lapis lazuli, and carnelian. Further exacerbating
the problem, most high-end smugglers are simply too sophisti-
cated, and the questionable acquisition practices of some deal-
ers, collectors, and museums, too entrenched to be defeated by
improved border inspections and heightened public conscious-
ness alone.
The sine qua non for effective interdiction, then, is an or-
26. See Bogdanos, supra note 22.
27. See id.
28. See id.
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ganized, systematized, and seamlessly collaborative law-enforce-
ment effort by the entire international community. We need co-
ordinated simultaneous investigations of smugglers, sellers, and
buyers in different countries. And-just as important-prosecu-
tion and incarceration need to be credible threats. Thus, as a
third component, the United Nations, through UNESCO,
should establish a commission to continue the Iraq Museum in-
vestigation, expanding it to include other pillaged countries as
well. Interpol, the International Criminal Police Organization,
must also become more active, entering into agreements with its
191 member nations stipulating that each country forward to
them immediately, along a secure network (that already exists),
a digital photograph and the particulars (who, what, when, and
where) of all antiquities encountered by law-enforcement or mil-
itary forces anywhere in the world-including those items that
were seized, as well as those that were inspected and not seized
because there was insufficient evidence of criminality at the time
of the inspection.
The global criminal enterprise that is antiquities smuggling
must be defeated globally through international cooperation
(promoted by UNESCO) and real-time dissemination of infor-
mation (enabled by Interpol). The consequent ability to con-
duct monitored deliveries of illegal shipments to their destina-
tions (a tactic long used against drug smugglers) would enable
legal authorities to incriminate and thereafter prosecute each
culpable party along the trail. It would also serve as a deterrent
to those collectors or curators who could never be sure that the
next shipment was not being monitored by law-enforcement offi-
cials.
4. Establish a Code of Conduct for Trading in Antiquities
Fourth, museums, archaeologists, and dealers should estab-
lish a strict and uniform code of conduct. Similar to ethics rules
for lawyers and doctors, this code of conduct would clarify the
documentation and diligence required for an artifact to change
hands legally. If they refuse such self-regulation, then Congress
should impose regulation. Although many argue that the inter-
ests of dealers, collectors, museums, and archaeologists differ
from each other so dramatically that any single code of conduct
acceptable to all is impossible, I point out that the differences
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within the art world are no greater than those existing between
prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys. Yet, the American
Bar Association has adopted and actively enforces a single Code
of Ethics applicable to every attorney admitted to the bar.29 Un-
til then, I continue to urge academics, curators, and dealers to
abandon their self-serving complacency about-if not complicity
in-irregularities of documentation.
5. Increase Cooperation between the Cultural Heritage Community
and Law Enforcement
Finally, the art community must break down barriers and
assist investigators by serving as law-enforcement's eyes and ears.
We need scholars and knowledgeable dealers as on-call experts
to identify and authenticate intercepted shipments, and to pro-
vide crucial in-court expert testimony. They should also request
appropriate law-enforcement personnel (depending on country
and focus) to provide detailed, factual briefings at every confer-
ence purporting to address art or antiquities smuggling. The
call for up-to-date investigative facts should become as standard
as the call for papers.
But the education and information exchange should run in
both directions. In 2004, Dr. C. Brian Rose, then First Vice-Presi-
dent of the Archaeological Institute of America, developed and
conducted cultural-awareness training in half-a-dozen pilot loca-
tions around the country for military personnel scheduled to de-
ploy to Iraq or Afghanistan. The program should be expanded
to include every unit deploying overseas. A similar program
should be offered to the FBI and the Department of Homeland
Security on a regular basis. Such cooperation between the art
and archaeological communities and the law-enforcement and
military presents a real chance of winning a fight we cannot af-
ford to lose.
III. FUTURE MILITARY CONFLICTS
The U.S. military has lessons to be learned as well. Looking
to the future, we must never again cede the moral high ground
on issues of cultural sensitivity and national patrimony. Thus,
before the U.S. military takes action in any country, our com-
29. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1980).
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manders must clearly articulate our recognition of that country's
proud cultural heritage and our intent to protect such property,
to the extent possible, during the conflict and post-conflict stage.
Not just the message, but the actions that flow from it, must con-
vince the world that the United States and, in particular, the U.S.
military are committed to honoring and preserving the heritage
of all nations and religious traditions.
To do so, military leaders must plan before any action for
the protection of cultural property in the proposed area of oper-
ations. This protection must go beyond merely putting the site
on the no-strike list. It must include the securing of significant
sites (as identified by members of the archaeological commu-
nity) and the immediate deployment, if needed, of on-call secur-
ity forces (identified in advance of the operation) upon reports
of looting. Where such forces already exist, U.S. military forces
should assist by providing them with vehicles, radios, and train-
ing. Where no such forces exist, the U.S. military must protect
the sites until trained forces are available. Such preparation
would enable planners to identify shortfalls and-where appro-
priate-attempt to fill such needs from international organiza-
tions or coalition countries before the conflict.
Diverting resources to save cultural artifacts during a time of
war may seem trivial considering the human cost of war. But
some wise soldiers before us have seen the wisdom. "Inevitably,
in the path of our advance will be found historical monuments
and cultural centers which symbolize to the world all that we are
fighting to preserve," said General Dwight Eisenhower, just
before D-Day during the deadliest war of the last one hundred
years, one that threatened our nation's existence. "It is the re-
sponsibility of every commander to protect and respect these
symbols whenever possible."
CONCLUSION
Antiquities trafficking will never merit the same attention or
resources as terrorism, drugs, human trafficking, or violent
street crime. But, at the very least, it deserves to be on the same
list. From government corridors, precinct headquarters, and
media newsrooms to faculty lounges, museum boardrooms, and
galleries on Madison Avenue, this cultural catastrophe must be
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confronted and debated. We must expose those who engage in
the illegal trade for what they are: criminals.
More than four years after the looting, the list of missing
pieces is still far too long-and still includes the one that breaks
my heart. It is the piece that is on the cover of my book, Thieves
of Baghdad: the Lioness attacking a Nubian Boy, an extraordinary
eighth century B.C. chryselephantine ivory plaque inlaid with la-
pis and carnelian and overlaid with gold. It is, in my view, the
single most exquisite and historically significant piece that is still
missing. Which is why it is on the cover-a painful reminder to
me that my journey has only just begun.
On my first tour in Iraq, our mission was to track down ille-
gal arms and terrorist networks. My decision to expand our mis-
sion to include investigating the looting of the Iraq Museum and
tracking down the stolen artifacts was characterized by many as a
distraction. I regret that I did not pursue that distraction even
more.
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